自2006年5月起，中國上市公司得利用定向增發方式募集資金，使定向增發成為企業融資的主要管道。本研究以2006年至2015年進行定向增發的中國上市公司為樣本，檢視保薦機構聲譽對定向增發折價幅度影響。本研究亦檢視保薦機構聲譽對公司於定向增發後當年及次年營運績效是否有所影響。由於發行公司董事需配合保薦機構履行監督責任，本研究檢視保薦機構聲譽與獨立董事專業能力交互作用對定向增發後當年及次年營運績效之影響。此外，本研究檢視保薦機構聲譽與獨立董事兼職程度交互作用對定向增發後當年及次年營運績效之影響。
實證結果顯示，保薦公司聲譽並未顯著影響公司定向增發折價幅度。本研究實證結果亦顯示，保薦機構聲譽對公司於定向增發後營運績效並無顯著影響。此外，保薦機構聲譽與獨立董事有否具會計師資格之交互作用並未顯著影響定向增發後營運績效。保薦機構與獨立董事兼職程度之交互作用並未顯著影響定向增發後營運績效。

Chinese listed firms have raised funds through private placements since May 2006. Private placement has become an important financing method for firms to raise funds. This study investigates to what extent of private placement discount is affected by the reputation of sponsoring company using sample of private placement firms from 2006 to 2015. This study also examines to what extent of operational performance after private placements is affected by a sponsoring company’s reputation. Moreover, this study examines (1) how the interaction between a sponsoring company’s reputation and independent directors’ expertise, and (2) how the interaction between a sponsoring company’s reputation and independent directors’ interlocking affect the extent of operational performance after private placements.
The empirical results show that the reputation of the sponsoring company does not significantly affect the company's private placement discount. The empirical results also show that the reputation of the sponsoring firms has no significant impact on the company's operating performance after private placements. In addition, the interaction between the reputation of the sponsoring company and whether the independent director is a certified public accountant does not significantly affect the operational performance after private placements. The interaction between the reputation of a sponsoring company and the independent director's interlocking does not significantly affect operational performance after private placements.

一、中文部分
王躍堂、趙子夜及魏曉雁(2006)董事會的獨立性是否影響公司績效？經濟研究，
第5期：頁62-73。
吳育輝、魏志華及吳世農(2013)。時機選擇、停牌操控與控股股東掏空—來自中國上市公司定向增發的證據。廈門大學學報，哲學社會科學，第1期：頁46-55。
陳政(2008)。非公開發行折價、大小股東利益衝突與協同。證券市場導報，第8期：頁28-35。
章衛東及李海川(2010)。定向增發新股_資產注入類型與上市公司績效的關系_來自中國証券市場的經驗証據。江西財經大學會計發展研究中心，第3期：頁58-65。
章衛東、李斯蕾及黃軒昊(2016)。資訊不對稱_公司成長性與關聯股東參與定向增發_來自中國証券市場的經驗數據。證券市場導報，第2期：頁19-27。
張鳴及郭思永(2009) 。大股東控制下的定向增發和財富轉移—來自中國上市公司的經驗證據。會計研究，第5期：頁78-86。
葉康濤、祝繼高、 陸正飛及張然(2011) 。獨立董事的獨立性：基於董事會投票的證據。 公司治理學學科前沿研究報告，第1期：頁60-78。
劉春燕、許肖肖及袁少茹(2017)。定向增發對上市公司經營績效的影響_基於徐工機械兩次定向增發的案例。財會通訊，第23期：頁101-104。
(1) 謝曉菲(2016)。上市公司定向增發財務績效研究_基於生命週期理論的視角。黑龍江工業學院學報，第6期：頁56-60。
蕭萬(2012)。定向增發中的大股東控制權強化及其長期績效。廣東社會科學，第5期：頁49-54。
蕭萬及宋光輝(2013)。定向增發與其整體上市_宣告效應_長期績效的比較研究。河南大學學報，社會科學，第53卷第5期：頁51-57。
二、英文部分
Barclay, M. J., Holderness, C. G., and Sheehan, D. P. 2007. Private placements and managerial entrenchment. Journal of Corporate Finance 13(4): 461-484.
Beasley, M. S. 1996. An empirical analysis of the relation between the board of director composition and financial statement fraud. The Accounting Review 71(4): 443-465.
Carter, R. B., Dark, F. H., and Singh, A. K. 1998. Underwriter reputation, initial returns, and the long-run performance of IPO stocks. The Journal of Finance 53: 285-311.
Carter, R., and Manaster, S. 1990. Initial Public Offerings and Underwriter Reputation. The Journal of Finance 45(4): 1045-1067.
Cohen, D. A., Dey, A. and Lys, T. Z. 2008. Real and accrual‐based earnings management in the pre‐ and post‐Sarbanes‐Oxley periods. The Accounting Review 83(3): 757-787.
Cronqvist, H., and Nilsson, M. 2005. The choice between rights offerings and private equity placements. Journal of Financial Economics 78: 375-407.
Elloumi, F., and Gueyie, J. P. 2001. Financial distress and corporate governance: an empirical analysis. Corporate Governance: The International Journal of Business in Society 1(1): 15-23.
Fama, E. F., and Jensen, M. C. 1983. Separation of ownership and control. Journal of Law and Economics 26: 301-325.
Ferris, S., Jagannathan, M., and Pritchard, A. 2001. Too busy to mind the business? Monitoring by directors with multiple board appointments. The Journal of Finance 58(3): 1087-1111.
Fich, E. M. and Shivdasani, A. 2006. Are busy boards effective monitors? The Journal of Finance 61(2): 689-724.
Hertzel, M., and Smith, R. L. 1993. Market discounts and shareholder gains for placing equity privately. The Journal of Finance 48: 459-485.
Hertzel, M., Lemmon, M., Linck, J. S., and Rees, L. 2002. Long-run performance following private placements of equity. The Journal of Finance 57(6): 2595-2617.
Klein, A. 2002. Audit committee, board of director characteristics, and earnings management. Journal of Accounting and Economics 33(3): 375-400.
Krishnamurthy, S., Spindt, P., Subramaniam, V., and Woidtke, T. 2005. Does investor identity matter in equity issues? Evidence from private placements. Journal of Financial Intermediation 14: 210-238.
Peasnell, K. V. , Pope, P. F., and Young, S. 2005. Board monitoring and earnings management: Do outside directors influence abnormal accruals? Journal of Business Finance and Accounting 32(7-8): 1311-1346.
Wruck, K. H., 1989. Equity ownership concentration and firm value: Evidence from private equity financings. Journal of Financial Economics 23: 3-28.