公司的理財目標是將股東財富最大化，亦即股票市值最大化，而反映股東財富增值幅度的內部財務指標中，最為敏感者即為股東權益報酬率，因此杜邦公司設計和運用此分析方法時，以股東權益報酬率作為分析的核心指標。上市公司所揭露的資訊為投資人重要的參考指標之一，投資人藉由公開資訊評估該公司股票的投資風險與報酬。運用杜邦分析可提高財務報表分析的效率，不僅能簡潔地分析企業所揭露的財務資訊、系統操作性強，並能直觀而有系統地反映出企業的財務狀況。
　　通常當公司發生財務困難時，經營者傾向減少揭露或規避性地揭露資訊，避免對公司股價及投資者信心產生不利影響。因此投資人若僅以財報分析作為投資決策依據，極有可能矇蔽於過度處理的財務報表，在委託及代理關係中，委託人和代理人之間經常發生代理衝突，而為了緩解上述衝突，委託人和代理人之間應當建立有效的激勵與約束機制；若經營者的收入與股東利益產生正向關聯，則實現股東利益最大化時亦可實現經營者的利益最大化，引導經營者關注股東權益報酬率及與其相關的財務指標。鑑於大型公司財報不實等弊端，推行有效的公司治理，則可大幅降低財務報表被操弄的可能性；而公開揭露的財報資訊也較能取信於投資者。
　　本研究結果有二項發現，首先杜邦分析雖已行之有年，仍可作為選擇股票價值投資之依據，尤其是（一）資產周轉率高對股價報酬有正向影響。（二）槓桿比率高對股價報酬有正向影響。其次，提高有效的公司治理，可以提高前述的正向影響：（一）大股東持股比率低，可以提高資產周轉率對股價報酬的正向影響。（二）經理人佔董監事席次比高，可以提高資產周轉率對股價報酬的正向影響。（三）席次控制百分比低，可以提高資產周轉率對股價報酬的正向影響。

The mainstream view is maximizing shareholder’s wealth, regarding the financial objectives of a company. That is to maximize the stock market value. Among the internal financial indicators, Return on Equity (ROE) is the most sensitive indicator for reflecting the increment of shareholders’ wealth. Consequently, DuPont Analysis adopts ROE as the core of its analysis. The information disclosed by listed companies is an important reference for investors to predict the risk and return of investing in stock. With concisely analyzing disclosed information, DuPont Analysis not only improves the efficiency of financial statement analysis, but also straightly and systematically reflects the financial status of enterprise.
If a company encounters financial difficulties, it would tend to reduce or evade disclosing information for avoiding the negative impact on its share price or investors’ confidence. Investors are more likely to be covered by the manipulated financial statements if they simply rely on these public information. The principal-agent conflict is inevitable in the relationship between the principal and the agent. In order to mitigate this agency problem, effectively establishing the incentive and restraining mechanisms is necessary. When the top manager's income positively correlates with shareholders’ interests, maximizing the interests of shareholders is associated with realizing the maximization of top managers’ interest. Therefore, top managers are guided to concern the rate of ROE and its related financial indicators. Stemming from the dishonesty of large companies, the implementation of corporate governance decreases the likelihood of manipulating financial statements and increase the reliability of publicly disclosing information.
This study contributes to the literature as followings. DuPont analysis, an ancient analysis method, remains a useful reference for investment. First, high asset turnover has a positive effect on stock price return. Second, high leverage ratio has a positive effect on stock price returns. Improving the effective corporate governance can increase the aforementioned positive impact: First, major stockholders have a low shareholding ratio which can increase the positive impact of the asset turnover rate on stock price gains. Second, managers have a higher ratio of supervisors which can increase the positive impact of asset turnover on stock returns. Third, the percentage of seat control is low which can increase the positive impact of the asset turnover rate on the return on share price reward.

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