公司議題日趨重要，近年來台灣的董事會存在肥貓的情形，使得董事報酬方案之設計更受到大眾的重視，金管會亦提出相關修正法規因應。而過去多將研究重點著眼於高階管理者的報酬，探討其對公司績效的影響，甚至有少許研究開始進一步分析報酬如何導致高階管理者後續決策行為，例如收購投資和創業基金投資等，而該風險性投資行為則會對公司績效產生影響。
故本研究期待能以董事作為研究對象，找出董事報酬(係指酬金)對風險性投資行為的影響，故本研究將分析台灣國內上市之電子工業公司，透過長期投資(轉投資)作為風險性投資行為之衡量，且進一步探討家族控制的調節作用，而本研究得出的結論為：當董事彼此之間報酬差異越大時，更願意進行風險性投資行為，但家族企業反而對此關係有弱化效果。

Scholars have paid increasing attention on the relationship between board compensation and corporate governance recently due to to the "fat cat" issue. Most studies, however, focused on how top manager compensation associates with performance without mentioning compensation and strategic decision-making. In this study, I analyze electronics industries in Taiwan seeking to find the relationship between board compensation and risk-taking behaviors. I find that when within-board compensation heterogeneity increases, board would engage more on long-term investments; meanwhile, family control would weaken this relationship.

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