中國改革開放以來，經濟增長成為地方政府官員晉升的重要考核指標。官員出於晉升的壓力，會增強其對企業的干預行為。為了能從地方政府獲得較多資源，企業會偏好迎合地方政府官員。當地方政府官員發生異動時，新任官員的政策執行呈現較高的不確定性，企業可能需調整其因應策略。因此，本研究係檢視市長異動對企業實質盈餘管理程度是否有所影響。本研究亦檢視企業型態及企業社會責任是否影響市長異動與企業實質盈餘管理的關聯性。
本研究以2010年至2017年中國上市公司為樣本，實證結果顯示，當市長發生異動時，企業進行實質盈餘管理程度較低。此外，本研究發現，當市長發生異動時，國有企業與民營企業的實質盈餘管理程度並無顯著差異。實證結果亦顯示，當市長發生異動時，企業社會責任績效佳的企業與企業社會責任績效差的企業進行實質盈餘管理的程度並無顯著差異。

After the Chinese economic reform and opening-up, economic growth has become an important performance evaluation indicator for promotion of local officials. For purpose of promotion, officials may intensify their interference in operation of enterprises. Firms tend to meet local officers’ needs to obtain more resources from local government. When local officials reshuffle, the policies to be implemented by the new officials are highly uncertain, and enterprises may need to adjust their operating strategies. Therefore, the objective of this study is to examine whether reshuffle of mayor has an impact on the magnitude of real earnings management. This study also examines whether types of firms and corporate social responsibility affect the relationship between reshuffle of mayor and real earnings management.
This study uses Chinese listed firms from 2010 to 2017 as the sample. The empirical results of this study indicate that when the mayors reshuffle, the magnitude of real earnings management is lower. In addition, this study finds that when the mayors reshuffle, the magnitude of real earnings management between state-owned enterprises (SOE) and non-SOE is not significantly different. The empirical results also show that when the mayor reshuffle, the magnitude of real earnings management between firms with good corporate social responsibility performance and those with poor performance of corporate social responsibility is not significantly different.

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