研究生: |
李靜 Li, Ching |
---|---|
論文名稱: |
家族企業公司治理與盈餘管理關聯性之探究—以中國為例 Exploring Relationship between Corporate Governance of Family Firms and Earnings Management:Evidence from China |
指導教授: |
陳慧玲
Chen, Huei-Ling |
學位類別: |
碩士 Master |
系所名稱: |
管理研究所 Graduate Institute of Management |
論文出版年: | 2016 |
畢業學年度: | 104 |
語文別: | 中文 |
論文頁數: | 51 |
中文關鍵詞: | 家族企業 、盈餘管理 、兩權分離 、接班壓力 、兼任比例 |
英文關鍵詞: | Family firms, Earnings management, Wedge, Pressure of succession, Interlocking |
DOI URL: | https://doi.org/10.6345/NTNU202204165 |
論文種類: | 學術論文 |
相關次數: | 點閱:216 下載:47 |
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家族企業因其股權結構使代理問題與非家族企業有所不同,進而影響家族企業盈餘管理行為。本研究以中國上市家族企業為樣本,分別檢視兩權分離程度、家族企業有否接班壓力,以及獨立董事兼任比例對中國家族企業盈餘管理之影響。本研究實證結果顯示,兩權分離程度愈大,家族企業盈餘管理程度愈低,此結果與本研究之預期不一致。然家族企業有否接班壓力及獨立董事兼任比例對家族企業盈餘管理行為並無顯著影響。
Due to differences in ownership structure, agency problems of family firms are different from non-family firms. This study investigates to what extent of earnings management is affected by the wedge of control rights and cash flows right using family firms in China. We also examine the effects of the pressure of succession on earnings management. In addition, this study investigates how independent boards interlocking affects family firms’ earnings management behavior.
The empirical results show that the extent of earnings management is lower for Chinese family firms with larger separation between control rights and cash flow rights. This result is inconsistent with our expectation. The pressure of succession and an independent board interlock have no significant impact on the extent of earnings management.
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