私募是中國上市公司募集資金的重要管道，本研究旨在探討有大股東參與私募認購的公司是否傾向在大股東閉鎖期結束之後操弄盈餘。此外，本研究檢視政治關聯性是否會影響公司在大股東閉鎖期結束後的盈餘管理幅度。公司可以運用兩種不同的盈餘管理方法，包括裁決性應計盈餘管理和實質盈餘管理操縱盈餘。相較於實質盈餘管理，裁決性應計盈餘管理較易被會計師等外部人發現。公司的聲譽及政治關係會因而受到負面的影響。因此具有政治關聯性的公司傾向使用實質盈餘管理。是以，本研究檢視政治關聯是否會影響私募公司在大股東閉鎖期結束之後，使用不同盈餘管理的決策。
　　實證結果指出，大股東閉鎖期結束後，有大股東參與私募認購的公司的盈餘管理並不具有顯著性。實證結果亦發現，在大股東閉鎖期結束後，政治關聯會影響盈餘管理的幅度。此外，在大股東閉鎖期結束後，政治關聯並未顯著影響公司採用不同盈餘管理方式。

Private placement is an important financing source for Chinese listed firms. The objective of this study is to examine whether firms whose large shareholders participate in private placements tend to manipulate earnings upwards after large shareholders’ lock-up period expires. Moreover, this study examines whether political connection increases the magnitude of earnings management after large shareholders’ lock-up period expires. Companies can use two different earnings management methods including accrual-based management and real activities management to manipulate earnings. Accrual-based management is easier to be detected by outsiders such as auditors than real earnings management. Firms’ reputation may have negatively impacts and further affect their political connection. Firms with political connection tend to use real activities management. This study also investigates whether political connection may affect private placement firms’ decision to use different earnings management strategies after large shareholders’ lockup period expires.
　　The empirical results indicate that the magnitude of earnings management after large shareholders’ lock-up period expires is insignificant. The empirical results also find that political connection increases the magnitude of earnings management after large shareholders’ lock-up period expires. Moreover, political connection does not affect firms using different earnings management strategies after lock-up period expires.

Al-dhamari, R., and K.N.I.K. Ismail. 2015. Cash holdings, political connections, and earnings quality: Some evidence from Malaysia. International Journal of Managerial Finance 11 (2): 215-231.
Allen, F., J. Qian, and M. Qian. 2005. Law, finance, and economic growth in China. Journal of Financial Economics 77 (1): 57-116.
Barclay, M., C. Holderness, and D. Sheehan. 2007. Private placements and managerial entrenchment. Journal of Corporate Finance 13: 461-484.
Berkman, H., R. Cole, and L. Fu. 2009. Expropriation through loan guarantees to related parties: Evidence from China. Journal of Banking and Finance 33 (1): 141-156.
Braam, G., M. Nandy, U. Weitzel, and S. Lodh. 2015. Accrual-based and real earnings management and political connections. The International Journal of Accounting 50: 111-141.
Chen, A.-S., L.-Y. Cheng, K.-F. Cheng, and S.-W. Chih. 2010. Earnings management, market discounts and the performance of private equity placements. Journal of Banking & Finance 34 (8): 1922-1932.
Chen, C. J., Z. Li, X. Su, and Z. Sun. 2011. Rent-Seeking Incentives, corporate political connections, and the control structure of private firms: Chinese Evidence. Journal of Corporate Finance 17 (2): 229-243.
Chen, K. C. W., and H. Yuan. 2004. Earnings management and capital resource allocation: Evidence from China’s accounting-based regulation of rights issues. The Accounting Review 79 (3): 645-665.
Chou, D.-W., M. Gombola, and F.-Y. Liu. 2010. Earnings management and long-run stock performance following private equity placements. Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting 34 (2): 225-245.
Cohen, D., and P. Zarowin. 2010. Accrual-based and real earnings management activities around seasoned equity offerings. Journal of Accounting and Economics 50 (1): 2-19.
Cohen, D., A. Dey, and T. Lys. 2008. Real and accrual-based earnings management in the pre- and post-Sarbanes-Oxley periods. The Accounting Review 83 (3): 757-787.
Dechow, P. M., and D. J. Skinner. 2000. Earnings management: Reconciling the views of accounting academics, practitioners, and regulators. Accounting Horizons 14 (2): 235-250.
Ding, R., J. Li, and Z. Wu. 2018. Government affiliation, real earnings management, and firm performance: The case of privately held firms. Journal of Business Research 83: 138-150.
Faccio, M. 2006. Politically connected firms. American Economic Review 96 (1): 369-386.
Fama, E., and M. Jensen. 1983. Separation of ownership and control. The Journal of Law and Economics 26 (2): 301-325.
Fan, J., and T. Wong. 2002. Corporate ownership structure and the informativeness of accounting earnings in East Asia. Journal of Accounting and Economics 33 (3): 401-425.
Fan, J., T. Wong, and T. Zhang. 2007. Politically connected CEOs, corporate governance, and Post-IPO performance of China’s newly partially privatized firms. Journal of Financial Economics 84: 330-357.
Fisman, R. 2001. Estimating the value of political connections. American Economic Review 91 (4): 1095-1102.
Fonseka, M. M., O. A. Farooque, R. L. Theja, N. Rajapakse, and G.-L. Tian. 2018. Political and interlocking connections in the boardroom on private equity placements. Emerging Markets Finance and Trade 54: 2053-2077.
Gunny, K. A. 2010. The relation between earnings management using real activities manipulation and future performance: Evidence from meeting earnings benchmarks. Contemporary Accounting Research 27 (3): 855-888.
Haw, I.-M., D. Qi, D. Wu, and W. Wu. 2005 Market consequences of earnings management in response to security regulations in China. Contemporary Accounting Research 22 (1): 95-140.
Healy, P., and J. Wahlen. 1999. A review of the earnings management literature and its implications for standard setting. Accounting Horizons 13 (4): 365-383.
Hertzel, M., and R. Smith. 1993. Market discounts and shareholder gains for placing equity privately. The Journal of Finance 48 (2): 459-485.
Hertzel, M., M. Lemmon, J. Linck, and L. Rees. 2002. Long-run performance following private placements of equity. The Journal of Finance 57 (6): 2595-2617.
Jian, M., and T. Wong. 2010. Propping through related party transactions. Review of Accounting Studies 15 (1): 70-105.
Jiang, G., C. Lee, and H. Yue. 2010. Tunneling through intercorporate loans: The China experience. Journal of Financial Economics 98 (1): 1-20.
Kothari, S., A. Leone, and C. Wasley. 2005. Performance matched discretionary accrual measures. Journal of Accounting and Economics 39 (1): 163-197.
La Porta, R., F. Lopez-de-Silanes, A. Shleifer, and R. Vishny. 1997. Legal determinants of external finance. Journal of Finance 52: 1131-1150.
Li, C., Y. Wang, L. Wu, and J. Xiao. 2016. Political connections and tax-induced earnings management: Evidence from China. The European Journal of Finance 22 (4-6): 423-431.
Liu, Q., and Z. Lu. 2007. Corporate governance and earnings management in the Chinese listed companies: A tunneling perspective. Journal of Corporate Finance 13 (5): 881-906.
Liu, Q., J. Tang, and G. Tian. 2013. Does political capital create value in the IPO market?: Evidence from China. Journal of Corporate Finance 23: 395-413.
Roychowdhury, S. 2006. Earnings management through real activities manipulation. Journal of Accounting and Economics 42: 335-370.
Schipper, K. 1989. Earnings management. Accounting Horizons 3 (1): 91-102.
Shleifer, A., and R. Vishny. 1997. A survey of corporate governance. The Journal of Finance 52 (2): 737-783.
Song, P. 2014. Private placement of public equity in China. Springer.
Tian, K.-R., and X. L. Wang. 2014. Private placement, earnings management and long-term stock returns. Finance and Trade Research 5: 147-156 (in Chinese).
Wang, Q., H. Anderson, and J. Chi. 2018. VC political connections and IPO earnings management. Emerging Markets Review 35: 148-163.
Wang, X.-L., S.-L. Guo, and J. Yu. 2016. Tradeoff between private placement and earnings management mode. Journal of Yunnan University of Finance and Economics 3: 133-144 (in Chinese).
Williams, J. L., and A. P. Tang. 2009. Private placements of convertible securities: stock returns, operating performance and abnormal accruals. Accounting and Finance 49 (4): 873-899.
Wruck, K. H. 1989. Equity ownership concentration and firm value: Evidence from private equity financings. Journal of Financial Economics 23: 3-28.
Wruck, K., and Y. Wu. 2009. Relationships, corporate governance, and performance: Evidence from private placements of common stock. Journal of Corporate Finance 15: 30-47.
Wu, Y.-H., Z.-H. Wei, and S.-N. Wu. 2013. Timing, listing suspension, manipulation and tunneling: A study based on evidence from equity private placement by listed firms in China. Journal of Xiamen University (Arts and Social Science), 215, 46–55 (in Chinese).
Yeh, Y.-H., P.-G. Shu, T.-S. Lee, and Y.-H. Su. 2009. Non-tradable share reform and corporate governance in the Chinese Stock Market. Corporate governance: An International Review 17 (4): 457-475.
Zang, A. Y. 2012. Evidence on the trade-off between real activities manipulation and accrual-based earnings management. The Accounting Review 87 (2): 675-703.
Zhang, W.-D. 2010. Private placement and earnings management: Evidence from China. Management World 2010-1: 54-63 (in Chinese).
Zhang, M., and S.-Y. Guo. 2009. Private placement under the control of major shareholder and wealth tunneling. Accounting Research, 2009-05, 78–86 (in Chinese).